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Cyber-physical systems, where computing and communication are used to fortify
and streamline the operation of a physical infrastructure, now comprise the foundation of
much of modern critical infrastructure. These systems are typically large in scale and
highly interconnected, and span application domains from power and water distribution
to autonomous vehicle control and collaborative robotics. Intelligent decision support in
these systems is heavily reliant on the availability of sufficient and sufficiently correct data.
Failure or malfunction of these systems can have devastating consequences in terms of
public safety, financial losses, or both.
The research described in this thesis aims to predict the impact of loss or corrup-
tion of data on operation of a cyber-physical system. Given knowledge of the respective
physical and functional topologies of the system, information exchange is abstracted as a
graph of interconnected data processing nodes. A model is created with each node mod-
eled as a stochastic colored Petri net. Populated with information about the reliability of
measurement, communication, storage, and processing devices, the Petri net model enables
estimation of the fraction of the node’s data that will be lost or corrupted.
A determination is made of each node’s criticality, based on the consequences of its
failure on overall system-level operation, using field data or simulation. Themeasure of data
corruption impact at a given node is the product of the two aforementioned metrics: i) the
extent of data corruption expected at the node and ii) its criticality. The proposed approach
can enable informed decisions about targeted investments in hardening of cyber-physical
system, specifically to mitigate the effects of corruption or loss of data.
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SECTION
1. INTRODUCTION
Many modern critical systems, ranging in scale from large distributed infrastructure
services such as distribution networks for water or electrical power are no longer comprised
of only traditional physical devices. In these cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems,
the cyber components include sensors deployed throughout the system to collect real-time
data. The data collected is then transmitted over communication lines to decision support
components that analyze the data and determine configurations that will optimize aspects
of systems operation. The configurations are then transmitted over communication lines
to control devices where adjustments to systems operation are actuated. When operating
correctly, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are expected to deliver more efficient service, and
often extended capability and features.
These improvements, however, come at a cost. Service delivery in a CPS is con-
tingent on the availability of sufficient and sufficiently correct data. If data required for
decision support is corrupted or missing, component- and/or system level-failures could
result in catastrophic or even fatal consequences. The goal of the research described in this
thesis is to quantify the effect of data loss or corruption on service delivery by a CPS.
Motivating examples for this work include past CPS failures caused by missing or
corrupted data. The European Space Agency’s ExoMars Schiaparelli Mars Lander was
lost due to a transient data corruption event [3]. During descent, the lander’s inertial
measurement unit produced erroneous data for approximately one second. This erroneous
data caused the navigation system to estimate a negative altitude, leading to premature
release of the parachute at a height of 3.7 km. The lander plummeted to the surface,
impacting at an estimated velocity of 150 m/s. The craft was destroyed on impact.
2Another motivating example is the crash of Air France flight 447, which is believed
to have been triggered by corrupt data reported from an iced-over pitot tube (the device
providing airspeed data) [4]. The loss of data and unavailability of airspeed information
caused the autopilot to disconnect. The flight crew had to take over control of the aircraft.
With conflicting and incomplete airspeed data, the flight crew became confused and made
decisions leading to eventual crash of the aircraft and loss of 228 lives.
As noted above, data integrity issues affecting large-scale cyber-physical infrastruc-
ture systems have the potential to affect many individuals and have significant economic
impact. In July 2012, two widespread blackouts in India left over 600 million individuals -
approximately 10% of the worlds population at that time - without power. Unreliable data
was identified as one of the causes of these outages. A post-event inquiry committee noted
the need for data reliability and recommended fortification of the communication networks
responsible for delivery of data to the load dispatch centers [5].
The potential for data corruption in CPSs has been recognized for some time.
Voas raised this concern in 1997 [6]. He noted that many CPSs are systems-of-systems,
constructed by integration of multiple commercial, off-the-shelf software application pack-
ages. CPS designers necessarily are limited in detailed knowledge of semantics of each
component. Between complexity and opacity, the semantic dependencies within systems-
of-systems are such that no single person can fully understand all details. There will
likely be undiscovered incompatibilities, leading to data corruption 1. Voas proposes a
methodology, interface propagation analysis, where errors are deliberately injected into an
operational system. Propagation of corrupted data is then monitored to determine impact.
This methodology is often infeasible in practice, as it requires testing of full-scale in-use
systems, or at a minimum, a duplicate test system. Crenshaw et al. propose what they
1The European Space Agency report notes this situation occurred in the Schiaparelli ExoMars Lander
incident. Individual components did not fail; they operated correctly during the landing phase. It was the
interaction of components and undiscovered gaps in specifications that resulted in the loss of the spacecraft.
3denote as the simplex reference model to limit fault propagation in CPSs [7]. They too note
that the integration of commercial off-the-shelf software into a CPS results in less than full
understanding of system behavior. Full verification becomes impossible.
In his PhD dissertation, Behrens notes that the hardware errors currently observed
in production systems could be considered inevitable, the rate of these errors is expected to
increase in future hardware generations, and a non-negligible number of errors are uncor-
rectable by hardware techniques such as error correcting codes and manifest as application
state corruptions [8]. These errors are potentially propagated to other components when a
process experiencing state corruption sends corrupted data to an external entity, i.e., sends
a corrupt message.
An understanding of the impact of missing or corrupt data has on cyber-physical
system components is required in order to enable appropriate hardening measures for the
most vulnerable and/or critical components. The objective of the research described in this
thesis is to create and demonstrate a methodology that quantifies the impact of corrupt and
missing data on the operation of CPSs. Previous studies have investigated the criticality
of physical components, as well as the impact that individual components have on overall
system service delivery. The original contribution of this thesis is a model that provides an
a-priori relative measure of the impact of missing and corrupt data on service delivery from
each cyber component. This model utilizes stochastic colored Petri nets to estimate the flow
of corrupted and missing data across the components of a CPS, and utilizes this information
in conjunction with estimates of physical component criticality to provide a measure of
the system-level impact of data loss or corruption on service delivery. Understanding this
impact can guide prioritization of hardening investments, leading to more robust CPSs with
improved service delivery characteristics.
4The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of foundational and related work. Section 3 describes the proposed approach. Section 4
illustrates the application of the proposed approach through a case study involving the IEEE
57-bus test system. Lastly, Section 5 provides concluding notes and describes areas for
continuing research.
52. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Critical cyber-physical systems, by nature and definition need to be reliable, de-
pendable systems. For the purposes of this thesis, dependability attributes are defined as
described by Avizienis et al. [9]:
availability: readiness for correct service.
reliability: continuity of correct service.
safety: absence of catastrophic consequences for the user(s) and the environment.
integrity: absence of improper system alterations.
maintainability: ability to undergo modifications and repairs.
As demonstrated by the motivating examples of the previous section, dependable
system operation requires sufficient and sufficiently correct data in order to deliver services
at the expected levels. Unfortunately, despite the attention paid to reliability during the
design phases of the system and its components, it is impossible to guarantee 100%-reliable
systems. As systems grow in scope and complexity, software and hardware errors become
unavoidable. Hardware errors are observed surprisingly often and their rates are expected
to only increase in successive hardware generations. Furthermore, a non-negligible number
of errors are uncorrectable by current hardware techniques, such as error correcting codes,
and manifest themselves as application state corruptions [8].
• A study by Schroeder et. al found error rates in deployed commodity servers orders of
magnitude higher than previously reported, with 25,000 to 70,000 errors per billion
device hours perMbit. More than 8%ofDIMMSwere affected by errors per year [10].
6• Hwang et. al studied DRAM errors from a diverse range of production systems
collecting almost 300 terabyte-years of data. Analysis indicated that almost a third of
memory banks showed signs of hard errors [11].
• Intel researchers note the reliability per bit tends to decrease by 8% each successive
processor generation [12], [13].
These failures can have significant real-world impact as illustrated in the following
anecdotal examples of failures [8]:
• Hardware faults corrupted the state of processes in some instances ofGoogle’sChubby
locking service resulting in at least one complete service failure.
• In 2008, a single flipped bit in a single machine propagated via messages to other
processes, causing an 8-hour outage of Amazon S3 service in the USA and Europe.
• When under high load, faulty hardware corrupted the payload of Amazon S3 user
message during 2008 and 2011.
• Magnolia, a social bookmarking website, had a major data corruption episode, losing
all user data; an event that led to the company’s closing.
• State corruption at the CPU level is a common occurrence in the Google Mesa data
warehouse system at the large scale in which it operates. Ensuring state integrity
becomes the responsibility of application developers who must add additional code to
check assertions, checksum results, and execute consistency checks against replicated
data [14].
Data corruption can also occur when malicious actors are present. Encryption,
message authentication codes, digital signatures and cryptographic hash functions are used
to protect sensitive information, authenticate users and detect message corruption [15]. Ma-
licious actions are not limited to communication channels. Researchers have demonstrated
7that parasitic effects in dynamic RAM can be exploited to change contents of neighboring
memory cells [16]. A proof-of-concept exploit was developed to demonstrate the feasibility
of this attack for off-the-shelf systems and further demonstrate the ineffectiveness of existing
countermeasures.
In addition to hardware errors and malicious actors, increasing system complexity
can cause potential sources of data corruption to go unnoticed. Attempts at reducing the
resulting errors include interface propagation analysis and the simplex reference model,
which were described in Section 1. In the latter, redundant controllers, with different oper-
ating characteristics, are utilized, providing operational diversity. An unreliable component
provides full features and aggressive behavior, while a trustworthy component provides
limited features with predictable, safe behavior. A third component, a checker, evaluates
inputs from the unreliable component and trustworthy component, selecting and propagat-
ing the input that is expected to maintain safe operation. In this manner corrupted data is
not allowed to propagate and cause the CPS to operate outside of defined safe operational
limits. This approach comes with additional costs of procuring and integrating the duplicate
and arbitrating components.
Many techniques have been proposed for modeling the reliability of combined
hardware/software systems. As an example, work by Friedman et al. develops extensive
statistical procedures to calculate reliabilitymeasures for hardware and software components
[17]. Despite this general activity, as of the publication date of this thesis, no studies outside
of our research group have aimed to specifically capture the effect of data corruption on
dependability attributes of a system.
Petri nets, and their derivatives, have been used as a basis for system reliability
models. The work most closely related to this thesis is presented in [18], which attempts
to illuminate dependencies between electrical and cyber infrastructures and quantify the
impact of data loss resulting from a malicious attack. The Petri nets described in their
work account for some missing data, however, the impact of corrupt and missing data is not
8the focus of the study. Malhotra et al. use Petri nets to model system dependability [19].
They propose a methodology to convert fault trees to general stochastic Petri nets (GSPN)
and stochastic reward nets (SRN), allowing for analysis of system dependability attributes.
Their work does not directly address data corruption. Chen et al. investigate the use of Petri
nets to model coordinated attacks on an electrical smart grid [20]. These attacks include
intentional, malicious data corruption or blocking of communication paths, which results in
data loss. Their work shows the sequence of actions during attacks, with the aim of gaining
an understanding of attack vectors. Propagation of corrupt data or ripple effects of data loss
are not directly addressed.
Understanding of component criticality for CPSs and determination of the impact
of individual component failures on service delivery are recognized needs. Sha et al. were
among the first to note the pressing need for theory and tools that facilitate understanding
of dependency relationships between components and the effects of these dependencies on
service delivery [21].
Failure dynamics within single, standalone networks have been the subject of ex-
tensive study. Systems today consist of coupled networks, whose failure dynamics differ
from those of individual networks. Among these differences is the increased vulnerability
of coupled networks to random failures [22].
A mechanism to quantify the impact of cyber components within a CPS is a first
step. Marashi et al. propose such a model, calculating two measures of CPS component
dependability; criticality (impact to overall service provision when a component fails) and
fragility (sensitivity of this component to failure of other components) [23]. This model
quantifies the interdependence of CPS cyber and physical components, and quantifying
the effect of fault propagation paths in the face of disruptive events. Woodard proposes a
conceptual CPN data corruption model [24]. This model facilitates the evaluation of data
corruption extent at any given time and allows for investigation of the impact data corruption
has on service delivery.
9This work extends the foundational work of Woodard and Marashi. The original
research contribution of this work is a model that quantifies and predicts the impact corrupt
and missing data have on cyber-physical data processing elements and the resultant impact
to overall system service delivery. The proposed approach and metric can enable informed
decision making in the hardening decision process, providing information as to which data
processing elements within a cyber-physical system, that fail due to missing or corrupt
data, have the most impact on overall system service delivery. Conversely, the information
provided by this approach informs decision makers as to those data processing elements
where missing and corrupt data issues have lower impact on service delivery. When limited
resources are available the proposed model can be used as an aid to applying resources
where greatest impact will be realized.
2.1. MODELS
Realworld physical systems components operate concurrently and in a non-deterministic
manner. Designing reliability into a cyber physical systems is a challenge and non-trivial
task. For example, in a system of even minor complexity, when communicated messages
are lost, process scheduling and timing of physical events are taken into account the number
of execution states becomes quite large - larger than reasonable for human designers to
understand all interaction patterns, including the impact of corrupted or missing data on
system operation. For many critical systems; vehicle control systems, life support systems,
nuclear power plant control systems, etc. reliability must be understood and designed in to
the system from the beginning. Further, it is impossible to inject faults and monitor failures
in many operating cyber-physical systems. Disruption caused by testing is not an option as
these systems provide critical services.
Models have become a preferred method to address these design challenges. De-
veloping models allows for a designer to gain 1) insight into the operation of complex,
concurrent systems; 2) understand completeness of the design and 3) confidence in the
10
design correctness. Petri nets and derivatives; colored Petri nets, stochastic Petri nets; have
been used as modeling environments that can aid in meeting these design challenges. Two
examples of use of Petri nets to model business processes are:
• Ericsson Telebit used CPNs to aid in development of the communication protocol
Edge Route Discovery Protocol (ERDP) [25]. Modeling, simulation and state space
analysis identified several issues and errors in the design prior to finalization.
• Huang et. al [26] used Colored Petri Nets to develop models and algorithms for
tracing the entire life of manufactured products.
2.2. INFORMAL DEFINITION PETRI NET
Petri nets are directed bi-partite graphs consisting of two mutually exclusive node
classes, labeled as either a Place or a Transition. Arcs connect places to transitions and
vice-versa. It is invalid for an arc to connect two places or two transitions. Each place may
contain one or more Tokens.
In a standard PN, tokens are untyped and no distinction is made between individual
tokens. Places contain discrete numbers of tokens. The set of tokens held in a particular
place is the Marking of that place. A distribution of tokens across all places is denoted
as a Marking of the Petri net. Transitions are enabled when sufficient tokens exist in all
of the transition’s input arcs. When enabled a transition may Fire consuming input tokens
and producing tokens on output arcs. In a standard PN execution is nondeterministic when
11
multiple transitions are enabled simultaneously. The Initial Marking of the PN is specified
by assigning a number of tokens to Places as required by the model. Graphically, Colored
Petri Nets are represented as follow:
• Places as ovals
• Transitions as rectangles
• Arcs by line segments.
Arrowheads indicate direction of token flow. Arcs connecting transitions to places
are referred to as Input Arcs, arcs connecting places to transitions are referred to as Output
Arcs. Figure 2.1 shows an example of a simple CPN.
Petri Net markings over time create a State Space. Analysis of the state space allows
for understanding of system behavior and properties, such as state reachability.
2.3. PETRI NET DEFINITION
A basic Petri net, N , is defined as the tuple N = (P,T, A,M0) where:
• P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} : a finite set of places
• T = {t1, t2, ..., tn} : a finite set of transitions
• P
⋂
T = Φ and T
⋂
P = Φ
• A = {a1, a2, ..., an} : a finite set of arcs
• A ⊆ (PxT)⋃(PxT)
• M0 = {mp1,mp2, ...,mpn} : the initial marking
12
Figure 2.1. Simple Petri Net
2.4. COLORED PETRI NETS
An extension to basic Petri Net models is Colored Petri Nets (CPN). CPNs extend
PNs by adding a type, ColorSet, with enumerated (possibly infinite) values, Color to the
token specification. This allows for distinction among tokens and behavioral changes based
on token type and value. The definition of Place is extended to include a list of permitted
ColorSets allowed to be held as tokens in each Place. Arc definition is extended to include
an Arc Expression function or functions. Type checking is then performed on input and
output arcs. Arcs are enabled only when sufficient number of corresponding token types
are available. A second extension, Guard Expression is also added. Guard Expressions
evaluate input arc token types and values to produce a Boolean true or false value. If the
evaluation results in a true condition the arc is enabled, if the evaluation evaluates to false
the arc is disabled. If the Guard Expression evaluates to false, the transition is not enabled
(irrespective of the number and type of input tokens). The Guard Expression concept
enables multiple simultaneous arcs to connect the same Places. Behavior is determined at
runtime based on token type and value. If there are multiple enabled transitions connecting
two places, only one is selected using a stochastic process.
Examples of Petri include:
• Modeling of human and animal metabolic systems, [1]
• Design of urban traffic light control system, [2]
13
Figure 2.2. Colored Petri Net Used to Model Human Metabolic Systems [1]
Figure 2.3. Colored Petri Net Used to Model Urban Traffic Control System [2]
2.5. COLORED PETRI NET DEFINITION
The Colored Petri net Definition includes definitions of the standard Petri net and
adds:
A DTSCPN, N , is thus defined as the tuple N = (P,T, A, Σ, F,C, E,G,M0). Defini-
tion of P,T, AandM0 are as in the original Petri net definition. The additional tuple elements
are defined as:
• Σ = {c1, c2, ..., cn} : a finite set of non-empty color sets (type)
• F = node function mapping A onto (PxT)⋃(PxT)
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• C = color function mapping P into Σ
• G = guard function mapping T into expression: ∀t ∈ T , type G(t) = BOOLEAN
• E = arc expression mapping from A such that ∀a ∈ A, type E(a) = C(p(a))
2.6. DISCRETE TIME STOCHASTIC PETRI NETS
Molloy describes a further extension to Petri nets, discrete-time stochastic Petri nets
(DTSPN) [27]. DTSPNs further extend Petri nets and colored Petri nets with specification
of a non-zero firing probability for each enabled transition. The discrete time stochastic
Petri net may be viewed as a standard Petri net where at each time step any number
(including none) of enabled transitionsmayfire based on probabilities attached to transitions.
The probability of an enabled transition firing is “memoryless,” depending only on the
probability specified and not on previous firing history or current time step. Discrete time
stochastic Petri nets are thus Markovian in nature, the reachability graph of a DTSPN can




The original research contributions of this work are twofold. First, architectural
changes were made to a colored Petri net simulation model to increase modeling perfor-
mance, provide programmatic control of transition firing probabilities, and enable interac-
tion with external tools during simulations via a set of application programming interfaces.
Second,a model is developed that quantifies the potential impact missing and corrupt data
have on CPS data processing components and the resultant impact to service delivery. This
metric provides a calculated relative measure of service delivery impact to each component,
and provides a means to rank corrupt and missing data impact component by component.
It is envisioned this metric will be used in the hardening decision making process, pro-
viding data identifying those areas of a system having most impact of service delivery
when affected by missing and corrupt data and those areas of a system where missing and
corrupt data have lower impact on service delivery. When limited resources are available
the proposed model can be used as an aid to applying resources where greatest benefit will
be realized.
Thiswork extends two foundational research projects, those ofWoodard andMarashi
[24], [28], [23]. Consistent with their work, survivability is defined qualitatively as a
system’s ability to continuously deliver essential services and exhibiting failure resistance
and graceful degradation. Two survivability quantitative metrics are seen in Figure 3.1,
Extent of Degradation and Rate of Degradation. These metric will be calculated as:
• Extent of Degradation: δ = maxt0≤t≤td |M(t0) − M(t)|





Figure 3.1. Survivability Metrics
This work extends two aspects of theMarashi andWoodard work. An idealized Petri
net model was proposed to enable quantification of missing and corrupt data propagation.
The idealized model implements an idealized 3x3 system model. This work extends this
model from the described idealized 3x3 topology to allow topologies modeling the data
processing element topology within a cyber-physical system. Second, a methodology was
proposed in theseworks to calculate theCriticality of each component. Criticality is defined
as a measure of the consequences of a component failure on overall service delivery. In the
referenced work, to calculate criticality a set of failure cases is generated and simulated. For
each failure case k, the highest level of service degradation is measured as δk . Component
































The first term normalizes the amount of service delivery impact. The second term
normalizes the rate of impact at the instant of component i’s failure at time t during failure
case k. The third term, the second derivative, is considered to be indicative of the immediate
impact of component i’s failure during the failure case.
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This work extends this method and it’s application to quantify the criticality of data
processing component failures to service delivery. A high level view of this model is found
in Figure 3.3. This figure shows data flows within and across the model components. Steps
in this process are:
I. The data processing topology corresponding to the cyber-physical system topology
is abstracted as a graph
II. An estimate of the extent of data corruption expected at each node is determined
using a colored Petri net model
III. The set of data processing component criticality values are calculated
IV. The two data sets are provided as input to a calculation of data corruption impact for
each cyber component.
3.1.1. Step 1: Topology Abstraction. The first step in the process is design of a
colored Petri net model mapping the CPS cyber component topology into a colored Petri
net topology. A standard CPN node is defined to model each cyber component. Figure
3.2 provides a graphical view of Petri net components within a node. Following standard
Petri net nomenclature, places are denoted with ovals, transitions with rectangles and arcs
as connecting arrows. Direction of data flow is indicating by the arrow direction with
two-headed arrows indicating two-way data flow. Components within each node are:
• Sensor(s): one or more sensors providing local data
• Input: an entry point to receive data from connected nodes
• Detection and Cleansing: entities that detect and cleanse incoming data from sensors
and inputs
• Database: a database holding a set of historical data values
• Processing: local processing of database entries which may produce corruption
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This node is then connected to other nodes as defined by the cyber topology creating
the complete CPN model of the CPS cyber components.
Rather than using fixed values for communication, sensor and processing failures,
and to enable closer modeling of real-world devices, node-specific probability values are
assigned to the following events:
• Probability of local sensor(s) producing corrupt data
• Probability of local sensor(s) not producing data when expected (i.e. missing value)
• Probability of local processing corrupting entry in node database
• Probability of local processing dropping data from node database (i.e. creating a
missing value)
• Probability of inter-node communication producing corrupt data
• Probability of inter-node communication not producing data (i.e. producing amissing
value)
Node definitions include optional, configurable mitigation capabilities. If enabled,
corrupt and missing data are cleansed at specified probabilities.
Global parameters specified include number of simulation steps (time) and the
number of simulation iterations to execute.
3.1.2. Step 2: Data Corruption Extent Estimation. Analysis is performed on
simulation output to collect data on amount of corrupt and missing data per execution step
per node as well as the contiguous step sequence lengths where corrupted and missing
data exceed specified limits. Figure 3.4 shows a graphical representation of this data for
the decision support node. 1 Output of this step, A used in the final step is the average
1data shown reflect results from running multiple simulations, with 25,000 steps per simulation run.
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Figure 3.2. CPN Node Structure
percentage of corrupt and missing data within the node database.







For purposes of this work average corruption percent is calculated across all simulation
steps. 2
Figure 3.5 shows a distribution of the number of consecutive simulation steps where
corrupted and missing data exceed a defined threshold for the device F6. This data can
provide insights regarding how much missing and corrupt data must be tolerated in an
individual node while continuing to provide service. This data is provided to demonstrate
that shorter runs of corrupted data over the defined threshold occur more frequently than
longer runs of corrupted data. The model presented her provides this data however full
analysis of the data is outside the scope of this work 5.
2This work includes capture of addition model state space data. While note used in analysis described in
this work it is available for future research. Refer to Section 5 for a description.
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3.1.3. Step 3: Data Processing Component Criticality Calculation. The second
process step is to calculate an aggregate criticality of cyber components, Data Processing
Component Criticality. The concept of criticality was introduced byMarashi [23]. Critical-
ity can be informally expressed as ameasure of howmuch a single component affects system
survivability. Marashi provides a formal definition of criticality and methodology used to
calculate criticality for a single physical component. Multiple physical components can be
affected and controlled by a single cyber component. This work introduces the concept of
aggregate criticality. Data processing component criticality is, in essence, a measure of
the cascading criticality of all physical components directly connected to a specific data
processing component. For purposes of this model it is assumed that failure of a cyber
component results in failure of those physical components directly attached.
Data processing component criticality is calculated as:
∀p ∈ P : {physical components} (3.4)
∀c ∈ C : {cyber components} (3.5)
αi = criticality of physical component i (3.6)
dc = {physical components directly affected byc} (3.7)





3.1.4. Step 4: Impact Calculation. The last step to combine the data processing
component criticality from Step 3 with corresponding corrupt and missing data measured
from Step 2. Impact is calculated as:
∀c ∈ C : C = {cyber components} (3.10)
Impactc = Criticalityc ∗ Ac (3.11)
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3.2. SIMULATION PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRATION
The foundational colored Petri net simulation code was developed to demonstrate
and validate this particular approach to modeling data corruption behaviors. Performance
concerns were not included in the original design goals. To enable simulation of large
and complex models it was necessary to analyze performance inhibitors and identify code
changes leading to improved simulation performance. Analysis of the simulation envi-
ronment and model architecture identified several areas where changes provide increased
simulation performance.
3.2.1. Design Review - Performance Inhibitors. While reviewing foundational
work, it was noted that CPN simulation performance was an inhibitor to modeling of
large, complex systems. Analysis of the CPN model and architecture provided opportunity
for architectural changes that would provide increased performance and add additional
capabilities while maintaining existing model semantics.
Individual nodes in the original model design consist of four places, twenty nine
transitions and ninety two arcs Figure 3.6. For each simulation step a marking calculation
is executed. This calculation consists of:
• Boolean guard functions are evaluated to determine is transition is enabled.
• Possible firing modes for each enabled transition are calculated by iterating over each
combination of input token(s).
When the step executes a random firing is selected from the set of firing modes for
each transition
Linux performance tools and the Python pStat module were used to characterize per-
formance and identify potential areas for performance enhancement. This characterization
indicated calculation of the marking iterations as computationally expensive and an area
where significant performance improvements could be realized. Table 3.1 shows captured
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data from the original node structure. Analysis of this data indicated significant time spent
in Python functions calculating possible firing modes. Simplification of node architecture
to reduce the number of transitions and arcs would reduce the number and size of potential
firing sets and have the desired performance enhancements.
Further review of the original node structure showed that multiple, mutually exclu-
sive transition guards were used to model probabilities of data corruption and cleansing.
For example, the process of communicated a valid token required three transitions; one for
the case where the token is successfully transmitted, one for the case where the token is
corrupted and one for the case the communication failed and the token is missing. Duplicate
arcs are required for each of these transition. Arc duplication resulted in duplicate iterations
with a corresponding performance impact.
3.2.2. Architectural Changes for Performance. A node simplification approach
was chosen to eliminate the use of per-transition guards and utilize Python language func-
tions. This approach resulted in a node structure with reduced number of elements; four
places, five transitions and eleven arcs [Figure 3.7].
Increased performance is also realized by migrating from use of transition guards to
user defined Python functions. This eliminates evaluating each guard function to determine
if enabled. The prior approach had multiple transitions with mutually exclusive guards.
This architecture necessitated enumeration of large number of possible firings. Using a
single arc with user defined callable Python function logic significantly reduces the number
of marking enumerations. Selection logic is pushed in to the user-written Python code.
More complex logic is possible than with the transition guard approach. The programmatic
approach also enables future work (see Section 5) allowing dynamic failure probabilities,
communication and integration with other simulation tools
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Tables 3.2 shows data from the re-architected node structure. Performance is sig-
nificantly improved. It is noted that changes result in greatly decreased number of library
calls. Overall execution time is also reduced. The same configuration and input files were
provided to both scenarios.
The following improvements are realized: 3
• Average runtime 4 reduced 47% (Table 3.3)
• Total function calls are reduced from 32,627,180,048 to 4,107,468,485.
• Procedures associatedwithmarking enumeration dominate the original node profiling
data and not the simplified node.
Table 3.1. pStat Data: Original Node
Calls Total Time Source File Function
1323597000 3197.956 data.py __add__
2862278160 1495.032 data.py cross
924429896 1315.219 nets.py bind
2021316504 1251.976 data.py __init__
11828344 1092.502 nets.py modes
918670448 1065.950 nets.py _check
915100035 793.465 built-in _functools.reduce
2647194000 700.647 data.py dict
1218004298 672.161 nets.py __init__
22870400 633.780 nets.py <listcomp>
Table 3.3 describes run time improvements following modifications.
3.2.3. Integration. Architectural and code changes were implemented allowing
for communication, exchange of control, and exchange of state information between the
colored Petri net simulation code and external applications. These integration additions
enable an external application to monitor simulation status, query the colored Petri net
model markings, modify the colored Petri net model markings, and to control simulation
3Simulation environment: Hardware: 3.40GHZ Intel i5-3570K CPU, 8GB DDR2 memory. Operating
System: CentOS 7 Linux (kernel version 3.10.0). Platform: Python 3.5. Data capture from 5 runs, 1000 steps
per run.
4Runtime measurements recorded under profiling environment
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Table 3.2. pStat Data: Revised Node
Calls Total Time Source File Function
65949625 169.710 nets.py _check
134599130 150.812 nets.py bind
127428690 140.599 data.py _add
72024565 133.213 nets.py check
101373765 115.053 data.py iterate
173463455 114.657 built-in hasattr
213798470 109.670 nets.py __init__
152628510 102.378 hashables.py __setitem__
2699880 91.940 nets.py modes
213805745 87.310 nets.py __setattr__
step execution. The interface is enabled via a command line parameter and based on TCP/IP
V4 socket interfaces. TCP/IP socket interface was selected due to the wide level of support
for exploitation of this programming model. For example, the MATLAB-based Power
System Analysis Toolbox (PSAT) could be extended to connect to, control, and query a
CPN model markings, using the returned data to adjust power flow parameters based on
levels of data corruption.
The external application is configured to listen for connections on a specified port.
If enabled, the CPN simulation attempts to bind to this port and proceeds to communicate
with the external application via a series of message flows. Figure 3.8 describes this content
and flow of messages.
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Figure 3.3. Model Overview
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Figure 3.5. FACTS Device F6 (l12−17) Consecutive Steps Over Threshold - Single Run


























 mitigateFunction(x, flagged, 0.5, 0.75) 
 communicationFunction(x, 0.001, 0.001) 
 (x, flagged) 
 x  sensorFunction(x, 0.001, 0.001) 
Figure 3.7. Simplified Node Structure
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Figure 3.8. External Application Message Flow
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4. APPLICATION TO CPS
Marashi has researched interdependencies between the cyber and physical compo-
nents of a CPS [23]. This work explores interdependencies via case studies using IEEE-14
and IEEE-57 bus systems [29]. This work focuses on the IEEE-57 bus system. The IEEE-57
bus test case is a simple approximation of the America Electric Power system deployed in
the Midwest U.S. in the early 1960s. There are 57 buses, 7 generators and 42 loads. An
IEEE-57 model augmented with cyber control components is used in this work as the basis
for tracking the flow of corrupted data. The focus of this work is on the impact to the
critical components identified byMarashi. In this model, cyber control components; phasor
measurement units (PMUs) and flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) devices and a
central control unit are overlaid over the physical IEEE-57 bus system. The topology of the
cyber components as defined by Marashi [Figure 4.3, page 37] is used as the basis for the
colored Petri net model used in this case study.
A stepwise CPN simulation is then executed. The current state information of each
place is logged, providing step-by-step detail of the CPN. This data becomes the input to
the next step, analysis.
Analysis is performed comparing captured state data against predefined thresholds
for total amount of permissible invalid data and number of consecutive steps where missing
and corrupt data exceed predefined limits. Individual transmission line criticality values
from previous simulations are used (Table 4.1).
Marashi’s simulation was conducted over 25 steps. Simulations of the overlaid
cyber topology of 25,000 steps each are executed, corresponding to 1,000 CPN steps per
power systems step. A configurable threshold (3% used in this model) was established
as the allowable percentage of corrupt/missing data for the central processing and PMU
nodes. Data collected capture the step number where database corruption exceeds the
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permitted threshold and number of steps duration. Consecutive over-threshold sequences
ranged from a minimum of 1 step to maximum of 115 consecutive steps. Corruption data
for each run and for each node was collected. Figure 4.4 shows an example of data from
cyber component F6 plotted per step for a single run. A trend-line showing the specified
allowable corrupted data limit is included. Data point below the threshold are colored blue
and green, those above the threshold orange and red. Table 4.2 shows database states of a
25,000 step simulation. Figure 4.1 shows this data graphically.
Table 4.2. CPN Databases: Percent Missing or Corrupt
Run
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l1−16 (F4) 1.03% 0.91% 0.96% 0.96% 1.29% 1.12% 1.08% 1.38% 0.93% 1.21%
l1−17 (F5) 1.05% 1.05% 1.20% 1.22% 1.23% 1.06% 0.69% 0.81% 1.07% 1.08%
l12−17 (F6) 1.06% 1.25% 0.91% 0.95% 1.30% 1.22% 0.97% 1.03% 1.47% 1.05%
l54−55 (F7) 1.31% 0.93% 1.04% 1.36% 1.13% 0.82% 0.90% 1.52% 1.10% 1.11%
l6−7 (F3) 1.40% 0.88% 0.89% 0.86% 1.03% 0.91% 0.94% 0.94% 1.43% 0.98%
l6−8 (F1) 0.90% 1.36% 1.33% 0.96% 1.19% 1.19% 1.43% 0.82% 1.22% 0.90%
l7−8 (F2) 1.11% 1.27% 1.06% 1.19% 1.25% 1.09% 1.20% 1.04% 1.19% 0.92%
dbProcessing 2.10% 2.10% 2.33% 1.94% 2.07% 2.18% 2.00% 1.75% 2.16% 2.30%
To assess criticality of overlaid data processing elements, aggregated measures are
calculated combining criticality of the underlying physical components with data corruption
percentages from the data processing elements from the CPN model.
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Physical aggregated criticality and fragility metrics are calculated for each PMU as:
Aggregate PMU Criticality
∀p ∈ P : P = PMU devices (4.1)
∀l ∈ L : L = lines attach to bus L (4.2)





Aggregate measures and information from the CPN model, specifically database
state, are then combined to calculate a figure-of-merit that quantifies the impact corrupt and
missing data have to the system and which cyber components are most at risk of impacting
system service delivery when affected by corrupt or missing data.
Using the criticality and average database state measures the impact metric can be
calculated as:
Impact
Impact: Ip = [Average Percentage Corrupt Data] ∗ Cp ∗ 100 (4.5)
Calculated values for FACTS devices are shown in Table 4.3. Comparison of
criticality measures between the Single Line Criticality in Table 4.1 against the Aggregate
Criticality and Impact in Table 4.3 show different orders. The Criticality value of 0.000
listed in the table for FACTS device F6 (line l12−17) reflects improvements to service delivery














Percent Missing or Corrupt Data
Run 0 Run 1 Run 2
Figure 4.1. Average Corrupted or Missing Data
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While single device criticality analysis provides one measure, the impact metric
showing the effect of missing and corrupt data shows a different order. The Impact measure
provides an additional mechanism for systems designers to use as they look at improving
systems reliability.
Table 4.3. FACTS Line Aggregate Criticality and Impact
Data Extent of Missing and Data Corruption
Processing Data Corruption Corrupt Data Impact
Node (Expected) Criticality (Expected)
l6−8 (F1) 1.13% 0.80 0.91
l7−8 (F2) 1.13% 0.69 0.78
l6−7 (F3) 1.02% 0.66 0.67
l1−16 (F4) 1.09% 0.63 0.68
l1−17 (F5) 1.05% 0.57 0.59
l12−17 (F6) 1.12% 0.28 0.31
l54−55 (F7) 1.12% 0.06 0.07
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Figure 4.2. IEEE-57 Bus Smart Grid
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Figure 4.3. IEEE-57 Bus Smart Grid with Cyber Control Components
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Figure 4.4. Percentage Corrupt or Missing Data
39
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
This thesis proposes a method for predicting the impact of data corruption at each
data processing node of a CPS, based on:
• The extent of data corruption expected at the node
• The consequences of the node’s failure in terms of service interruptions, i.e., its
criticality
A second contribution of this work is a performance improvement to a colored
petri net simulation. As this model is applied to more complex cyber physical system
topologies, the improved performance enables analysis of larger models. Replacement of
transition guard design with Python language functions will allow future work to include
more complex failure probability logic. For example, corruption probabilities can be made
dynamic, using distributions such asExponential,Weibull, Poisson, or evenmodeler-defined
as applicable, to meet specific needs.
A third contribution is enabling of integration of the data corruption modeling with
external tools. Interfaces have been developed allowing communication to external tools
at each modeling step. With the communication capability, external tools can take actions
based on current CPN marking, affect CPN markings, or step-by-step marking analysis.
The communication mechanism utilizes standard TCP/IP socket techniques and, as such,
enables connection to a wide variety of external tools.
An example application to an electrical distribution system was demonstrated. It
was demonstrated that combining importance analysis results with the colored Petri net
simulation results can provide predictive assistance to evaluate impact of data processing
element failure caused by corrupted or missing data. These predictive values can be used to
identify data processing elements where data corruption issues have the highest impact on
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system service delivery and where investments are required to improve systems reliability.
The proposed method aids in making determination of system, component or network
modifications necessary to meet service level requirements. As important as identification
of where investments are needed, knowledge gained from this method can also be used
to identify areas where hardening investments are of limited value. Identification of areas
where minimal service delivery impact is realized by hardening against failure allows for
resources to be applied to more critical areas of the cyber-physical system, resulting in both
improved service delivery and lower overall cost.
With the enabling contribution of this work it is anticipated that future work will
extend this research in the following areas:
• The model as described, is a template of idealized physical devices. Future work
can include developing models that more closely mirror actual physical devices
characteristics - the amount of missing or corrupt data than can be tolerated, both an
absolute percentage of missing or corrupt data at any one time and a threshold over
time (consecutive steps).
• Variations of the internal node database size can be explored to determine impact of
corrupted data and what tolerance levels provide acceptable service delivery.
• The model described captures raw state space data. Petri net state space analysis tools
and methods can be used against this data to quantify, describe and better understand
missing and corrupt data propagation patterns. Additional insight intomodel behavior
can be realized by performing reachability analysis of the captured state data.
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APPENDIX
EXAMPLE TRANSITION PROBABILITY FUNCTIONS
The following are examples of modeler written Python transition functions as de-




__author__ = "Erik␣Burgdorf ,␣edb4k4@mst.edu"
from random import random , randint
def processingFunction(x, pProcCorruption , pProcMiss , db_size ):
"""
Data corruption processing function
Inputs:
x: token database
pProcCorruption: probability of processing corruption
pProcMiss: probability processing creates missing data
db_size: number of tokens in database
Returns:
database with updated entries
"""
dbcontent = x.items()
slot = randint(0, len(dbcontent )-1)
p_proc = random ()
if p_proc <= pProcCorruption: # proc_corr
dbcontent[slot] = 1 # CORRUPT
elif p_proc > (1.0- pProcMiss ): # proc_miss
dbcontent[slot] = 2 # MISS
else: #
dbcontent[slot] = 0 # VALID
42
#
# trim db to appropriate number of entries
#
while len(dbcontent) > db_size:
del dbcontent[randint(0, len(dbcontent )-1)]
return dbcontent





pSensorCorruption: probability sensor corrupts token




p = random ()
if p <= pSensorCorruption: # sens_corr
r = 1 # CORRUPT
elif (1.0- pSensorMiss) < p: # sens_miss
r = 2 # MISS
else: #
r = 0 # VALID
return r





pTruePositive: probability corruption correctly detected









p = random () # p(detection)
if x == 0 and 0 <= p < pFalsePositive:
r = 0 # False positive
flagged = True
elif x == 1 and 0 <= p < pTruePositive:
r = 1 # True positive
flagged = True
elif x == 2:
r = 2 # Missing
flagged = True
elif x == 0 and pFalsePositive <= p < 1.0:
r = 0 # True negative
flagged = False
elif x == 1 and pTruePositive <= p < 1.0:









flagged: indication if token was flagged as corrupt
pFix: probability corrupt token is corrected







if flagged is True:
p = random () # p(mitigation)
if r == 1 or r == 2: # bad and missing
if 0 <= p < pFix:
r = 0 # mitigate
elif pFix <= p < pDrop:
r = 1 # unable to mitigate
else:
r = 2 # drop
elif r == 0: # good
if 0 <= p <= pDrop:
r = 1 # false mitigation
elif pDrop <= p < 1:
r = 2 # false drop
return r





pCommCorruption: probability communication corrupts token




p = random ()
if 0.0 <= p <= pCommCorruption: # comm_corr
r = 1 # CORRUPT
elif (1.0- pCommMiss) <= p < 1.0: # comm_miss
r = 2 # MISS
else: #
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